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Abstract
We study the value of public information in competitive economies with incom-
plete asset markets. We show that generically the welfare e↵ect of a change in
the information available prior to trading can be in any direction: there exist
changes in information that make all agents better o↵, and changes for which
all agents are worse o↵. In contrast, for any change in information, a Pareto
improvement is feasible, i.e. attainable by a planner facing the same informa-
tional and asset market constraints as agents. In this sense, the response of
competitive markets to changes in information is typically not socially optimal.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D52, D60, D80.
Keywords: Competitive Equilibrium, Incomplete Markets, Value of Informa-
tion.
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1 Introduction
The objective of this paper is to analyze the value of public information in the setup
of a competitive exchange economy under uncertainty in which agents trade in asset
markets to reallocate risk. It is well-known that when markets are complete, and
agents are initially uninformed, the receipt of a public signal prior to trading impairs
risk sharing and cannot improve welfare. Indeed, if the true state of the world is
revealed before markets open, no mutually beneficial risk sharing trade is possible.
This e↵ect has come to be known as the Hirshleifer e↵ect, after Hirshleifer (1971) who
produced an early example of it. If markets are incomplete, the arrival of information
still reduces the possibilities of trading gains from risk sharing, but a second welfare
e↵ect arises. Provided some residual uncertainty remains, agents can hedge it more
e↵ectively by conditioning their portfolios on the available information. We refer
to this as the Blackwell e↵ect, after Blackwell (1951) who compared the value of
di↵erent information structures in single-agent decision problems.
We begin our analysis with an example of the welfare impact of the arrival of
information before markets open in which the Hirshleifer and Blackwell e↵ects can be
clearly disentangled. We show that, depending on the nature of this information, one
or the other e↵ect dominates so that in equilibrium welfare can worsen or improve. In
the rest of the paper we extend the analysis to a general two-period exchange economy
with a single consumption good and a single round of asset trade wherein we study
the welfare e↵ects of arbitrary changes in information, starting from a situation
where agents may have some initial information, changes that do not necessarily
entail an increase or decrease in the information available to agents prior to trading.
While in our general analysis the welfare impact of a change in information cannot
be interpreted in terms of the Hirshleifer and Blackwell e↵ects, it is nevertheless
possible to provide an analogous interpretation that is helpful in understanding how
competitive markets deal with changes in information.
For this purpose it is instructive to compare the change in agents’ welfare in
equilibrium to welfare changes that can be achieved by a hypothetical planner who
faces the same constraints as agents in terms of the available assets and information.
We show that for a generic economy a (strict) Pareto improvement can be attained,
for any change in information, by tailoring agents’ portfolios to the new informa-
tion. When we compare competitive equilibria associated with di↵erent information
structures, an additional welfare e↵ect obtains because of adjustments in equilibrium
asset prices. We find that the overall e↵ect on welfare may be positive or negative.
More precisely, we show that generically, if markets are su ciently incomplete, there
exists a change in information that makes all agents better o↵ as well as a change
that makes all agents worse o↵; indeed, there is a change in information such that
any subset of agents is better (or worse) o↵.
Thus agents’ welfare can vary in any direction, depending on the change in in-
formation, in line with our findings in the example. Moreover, we can interpret
the welfare e↵ect of a change in information as having a positive component due to
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agents being able to tailor their portfolios to the available information, and a second
component that may be positive or negative for any individual agent arising from
the adjustment in equilibrium asset prices induced by the change in information.
This is in the same spirit as the decomposition of the overall welfare e↵ect in the
example into the Blackwell and Hirshleifer e↵ects.1 Our analysis provides an answer
to the question of how competitive markets respond to changes in information, and
how equilibrium changes in welfare compare with welfare changes that are attain-
able. Our results lead to the conclusion that competitive markets typically do not
deal with changes in information in a way that is welfare-improving even though it
is feasible to do so.
There is an extensive literature on the value of information in a competitive pure
exchange setting. A number of papers have followed Hirshleifer’s lead in comparing
competitive equilibrium allocations before and after the arrival of information. As-
suming complete markets, Schlee (2001) derives some conditions under which more
information is Pareto worsening.2 In an economy with incomplete markets, Green
(1981) and Hakansson et al. (1982) provide (quite restrictive) conditions under which
better information leads to a Pareto improvement, while Milne and Shefrin (1987)
present an example showing that welfare can also decrease. In contrast to the various
examples in the literature, the example in the present paper allows a clear under-
standing of the welfare impact of the arrival of information by explicitly decomposing
the overall change in welfare into the Hirshleifer and Blackwell e↵ects.
In our general welfare analysis we utilize the analytical apparatus developed
by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), and later generalized by Citanna et al.
(1998), to study the welfare e↵ects of local perturbations in competitive economies
with incomplete markets. These methods have been employed in particular by Cass
and Citanna (1998) and Elul (1995) to show that generically the welfare e↵ect of the
introduction of a new asset can be in any direction. We provide an analogous result
on the e↵ect of a change in public information prior to trading.3 While there are
some parallels between these two problems, they are analytically quite distinct. The
introduction of a new asset enlarges the set of feasible allocations, while this is not
1Unlike the Blackwell e↵ect, which we can properly speak of only for an increase in information,
the first (positive) component is present for any change in information. The second component bears
a closer relationship to the classical Hirshleifer e↵ect. Indeed, Gottardi and Rahi (2001) argue that
the Hirshleifer e↵ect is due to changes in equilibrium prices, induced by a change in information,
that alter agents’ budget sets. See footnote 13 for further discussion in the context of this example.
2For the case of complete markets, an alternative to the welfare analysis of competitive equilib-
ria is provided by Campbell (2004), who compares welfare at allocations associated with di↵erent
information structures when these allocations have to be feasible and, in addition, satisfy ex-post
individual rationality constraints. He shows that any increase of information in the sense of Black-
well (1951) has a negative e↵ect on agents’ welfare in the sense that each allocation associated with
the better information is ex-ante Pareto dominated by some allocation associated with the worse
information.
3We are able to exploit di↵erential techniques by employing a smooth parametrization of changes
in information, just as Cass and Citanna (1998) and Elul (1995) are able to use these techniques
by modeling the introduction of an asset in a way that avoids discontinuities.
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in general true for a change in information.4 Furthermore, the price changes that
underpin the welfare e↵ects are di↵erent. In our single-good setting, only the current
asset prices are a↵ected by a change in information. In contrast, the results of Cass
and Citanna (1998) and Elul (1995) also depend on adjustments in the future relative
prices of physical commodities that modify the set of transfers of state-contingent
consumption achievable through asset trading.5
The aforementioned techniques have also been used by Citanna and Villanacci
(2000) to study the e↵ect on welfare of the information revealed by prices in an
asymmetric information economy with multiple physical goods and nominal assets.
In their model, there is a continuum of equilibria which can be parametrized by the
future (state-contingent) price level. The authors compare a non-revealing equilib-
rium to a nearby equilibrium of the same economy at which asset prices reveal some
information, and show that generically there is an arbitrary change in welfare when
going from one equilibrium to the other, with the utility of any individual agent go-
ing up or down. In contrast, we consider an exogenous change in public information,
and show that the welfare change is arbitrary when we move from any equilibrium
of a generic economy to a nearby equilibrium associated with the new information
structure. Moreover, in our model with a single physical good and real assets, the
welfare change can be attributed entirely to the change in information under con-
sideration; it arises from agents being able to condition their portfolios on the new
information and from the adjustment in equilibrium asset prices resulting from the
change in information. In the analysis of Citanna and Villanacci (2000), on the other
hand, welfare e↵ects cannot be traced solely to the change in information, which is
endogenous, being the information revealed by asset prices. In their welfare results,
an important role is played by two additional price e↵ects which do not arise in our
model: adjustments in relative spot commodity prices in the future, and changes in
real asset payo↵s induced by changes in the future price level. The latter e↵ect is
unrelated to the change in information.
The paper is organized as follows. We describe the economy in Section 2. In
Section 3 we provide an example to illustrate the welfare e↵ects of changes in infor-
mation. The remainder of the paper is devoted to our formal results, on attainable
welfare changes in Section 4, and on equilibrium changes in welfare in Section 5.
Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Economy
There are two periods, 0 and 1, and a single physical consumption good. The econ-
omy is populated by H   2 agents, with typical agent h 2 H (here, and elsewhere,
4We elaborate on this point in footnote 12.
5In a single-commodity environment, Elul (1999) shows that it is generically possible to intro-
duce an asset in order to make all agents better o↵ (while it can never be the case that all agents
are worse o↵). The argument relies on identifying an asset whose introduction leaves the prices of
all existing assets unchanged. Thus price e↵ects play no role in this result.
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we use the same symbol for a set and its cardinality). Uncertainty, which is resolved
at date 1, is described by S states of the world.
Agent h 2 H has endowments !h0 > 0 in period 0 and !h 2 RS++ in period 1.
He has time-separable expected utility preferences with von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions uh0 : R++ ! R for period 0 consumption and uh : R++ ! R for
period 1 consumption. We assume that uh0 and u
h satisfy the standard smooth
preference assumptions, i.e. they belong to the set U := {  : R++ ! R |  2 C2, 0 >
0, 00 < 0, limx!0  0(x) =1}.
Asset markets, in which J   2 securities are traded, open at date 0. At date 1
assets pay o↵. The payo↵ of asset j in state s (in terms of the physical consumption
good) is denoted by rjs, and the vector of asset payo↵s in state s by rs 2 RJ . By
default all vectors are column vectors, unless transposed. Thus r>s = (r
1
s . . . r
J
s ). Let
R be the S ⇥ J matrix whose s’th row is r>s . We assume, without loss of generality,
that R has full column rank J . Markets are complete if J = S, and incomplete if
J < S.
Prior to trading, agents observe a public signal correlated with the state of the
world s. This signal does not directly a↵ect utility functions, endowments or asset
payo↵s. We fix a finite set of “signal realizations” ⌃, #⌃   2, with a typical element
of ⌃ denoted by  . The uncertainty over fundamentals, parametrized by s 2 S,
and the public signal, parametrized by   2 ⌃, can then be jointly described by a
probability measure on S⇥⌃, i.e. by the probabilities ⇡ := {⇡s }s2S, 2⌃ 2 RS⌃+ , where
⇡s  denotes Prob(s,  ). Let ⇡s|  := Prob(s| ), ⇡s := Prob(s), and ⇡  := Prob( ).6
The uncertainty over fundamentals is thus given by the marginal distribution over
S, {⇡s}s2S.
We refer to the vector ⇡ as an information structure.7 More precisely, an infor-
mation structure lies in the set8
⇧ :=
(
⇡ 2 RS⌃+
    ⇡s > 0, 8s 2 S; ⇡  > 0, 8  2 ⌃; X
s, 
⇡s  = 1
)
.
This specification admits a range of possible information structures. It includes
information structures that have full support over S for every  , i.e. S⇡( ) :=
{s 2 S | ⇡s  > 0} = S for all  . The set of these information structures is the interior
of ⇧, given by ⇧0 := {⇡ 2 RS⌃++ |
P
s  ⇡s  = 1}. A subset of ⇧0 consists of infor-
mation structures satisfying the independence condition ⇡s  = ⇡s⇡ , for all s,  , in
which case the public signal provides no information about s; we refer to such infor-
mation structures as uninformative. The set ⇧ also includes information structures
6Note that ⇡s and ⇡  are scalars.
7This is a slight abuse of terminology since ⇡ represents both the uncertainty over funda-
mentals and the information of agents. Describing information in terms of the joint distribution
{⇡s }s2S, 2⌃ is clearly equivalent to using the conditional distributions {⇡s| }s2S and the marginal
distribution {⇡ } 2⌃, with ⇡s  = ⇡s| ⇡ . But working directly with the joint distribution, captured
by the single vector ⇡, is notationally more convenient.
8The restriction on the marginal distributions over S and ⌃ is without loss of generality.
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for which the support S⇡( ) is a strict subset of S for some signal realizations. A
special case of the latter is one where the signal induces a partition over S.
We take as given the date 0 endowment !h0 and preferences u
h
0 of all agents h 2 H,
and parametrize economies by agents’ date 1 endowments and preferences, and the
information structure. Let ! := {!h}h2H 2 ⌦ := RSH++, and u := {uh}h2H 2 UH .
An economy is then a tuple (!, u, ⇡) 2 E := ⌦ ⇥ UH ⇥ ⇧, specifying the period
1 endowments and utility functions of agents and the information structure. We
formalize our notion of genericity as follows. The sets ⌦ and ⇧ are endowed with the
usual (Euclidean) topology. The set U is endowed with the C2 uniform convergence
topology on compact sets, i.e. the sequence uhn in U converges to uh if and only if
uhn, u
h
n
0
and uhn
00
converge uniformly to uh, uh
0
and uh
00
respectively, on any compact
subset of R++. The set of economies E is endowed with the product topology. By
“generic subset of ⌦,” we mean “for an open, dense subset of ⌦,” and likewise for
UH , ⇧ and E . By “generically” or “for a generic economy” we mean “for an economy
in an open, dense subset of E .”
Consider an economy (!, u, ⇡) 2 E . For signal realization  , let p  2 RJ be the
vector of asset prices (date 0 consumption serves as the numeraire), and yh  2 RJ
the portfolio of agent h. The consumption of agent h for signal   is then given by
ch0  := !
h
0   p  · yh  at date 0, and chs  := !hs + rs · yh  in state s at date 1. Let
y  := {yh }h2H , y := {y } 2⌃, c0 := {ch0 }h2H, 2⌃, and p := {p } 2⌃. A competitive
equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 1 Given an economy (!, u, ⇡) 2 E, a competitive equilibrium consists of
a portfolio allocation y, and prices p, satisfying the following two conditions:
(a) Agent optimization: 8h 2 H and   2 ⌃, yh  solves
max
x2RJ
⇣
uh0
⇥
!h0   p  · x
⇤
+
X
s
⇡s|  uh
⇥
!hs + rs · x
⇤⌘
. (1)
(b) Market clearing: 8  2 ⌃, X
h
yh  = 0. (2)
We will often refer to an equilibrium (y, p) of the economy (!, u, ⇡) as a ⇡-equilibrium
in order to emphasize the dependence of the equilibrium on the information struc-
ture. Since portfolios uniquely determine period 1 consumption, we can write a
⇡-equilibrium allocation as (c0, y).
We wish to study the welfare consequences of changes in information. Given ⇡ 2
⇧, we consider the set of alternative information structures ⇧ˆ(⇡) ⇢ ⇧ that represent
purely a change in information relative to ⇡ without a↵ecting the uncertainty over
fundamentals. Formally, ⇧ˆ(⇡) is the set of vectors ⇡ˆ in ⇧ satisfying the following
conditions:
a1.
P
 2⌃ ⇡ˆs  = ⇡s, for all s 2 S; and
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a2. {⇡ˆs }s2S is not proportional to {⇡s }s2S, for some   2 ⌃.
Condition a1 says that ⇡ˆ does not alter the marginal distribution over S implied by
⇡, while condition a2 says that there is an actual change in information.9 If ⇡ˆ 2 ⇧ˆ(⇡)
we say that (⇡, ⇡ˆ) is an admissible pair of information structures.
We begin with an example to illustrate the welfare e↵ects of changes in informa-
tion.
3 An Example
Consider an economy with four equally likely states and two assets. The state space
is S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}, and the asset payo↵ matrix is
R =
0BB@
1 +   0
0  1
 1 0
0 1 +  
1CCA
,
for some   > 0. There are two agents. For simplicity we assume that no consumption
takes place at date 0 and agents have no endowment in that period. Both agents
have the same quadratic utility function, u(c) = c  a2c2, for period 1 consumption,10
where the parameter a is positive and chosen to be small enough to ensure that the
marginal utility of consumption is positive in every state in equilibrium. Agents’
endowments are given by the matrix0BB@
!   ↵ +   ! + ↵   
!   ↵    ! + ↵ +  
! + ↵    !   ↵ +  
! + ↵ +   !   ↵   
1CCA
,
the (s, h)’th element of which is the endowment in state s of agent h. The parameters
↵ and   are positive, and ! > ↵+ . Notice that there is no aggregate uncertainty in
this economy. We can think of endowments as being subject to two kinds of shocks,
the ↵-shock and the  -shock, which a↵ect the agents in opposite directions.
The information of agents is described by a signal   that can take values  1 or  2
with equal probability; thus ⌃ = { 1,  2}. We consider an initial situation in which
agents have no information; the information structure is ⇡, which is uninformative
with ⇡s|  = 14 , for all s,  . We analyze the welfare e↵ect of two alternative changes
in information, to either ⇡ˆ or ⇡ˆ0; in both cases the signal conveys information about
9As an example of a “change” in information that does not satisfy a2, suppose ⇡ is uninforma-
tive, ⇡ˆs|  = ⇡s|  = ⇡s for all s, , and ⇡ˆ  6= ⇡  for some  . Clearly ⇡ˆ is also uninformative.
10While for our general results we assume that utility functions lie in the set U specified in
Section 2, for the purpose of the example it is convenient to use quadratic utility which is clearly
not a member of this class.
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the state of the world s, inducing a partition over S represented by the event trees
in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. Thus ⇡ˆ reveals the ↵-shock, while ⇡ˆ0 reveals the
 -shock. In both cases, the two states in each cell of the partition are equally likely.
Conditional probabilities are shown on each branch.
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Figure 1: Agents are worse o↵ under ⇡ˆ (Hirshleifer dominates Blackwell)
As a benchmark it is useful to consider the first-best symmetric allocation in
which both agents consume their ex-ante (i.e. evaluated prior to the receipt of the
public signal) expected endowment !, in all states.11 The ex-ante expected utility
of both agents is given by
U := !   a
2
!2
= UA +
a
2
(↵2 +  2),
11This is the unique competitive equilibrium allocation of this economy if markets are complete
and the signal is uninformative.
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Figure 2: Agents are better o↵ under ⇡ˆ0 (Blackwell dominates Hirshleifer)
where UA is the expected utility of both agents in autarky. Thus the first-best utility
gain from sharing the ↵-shock is a2↵
2, while the corresponding gain from sharing the
 -shock is a2 
2.
Under the assumed incomplete asset structure, agents are not able to insure fully.
It is straightforward to check that there is a ⇡-equilibrium in which the two assets
have the same (nonzero) price. Agent 1 buys an amount 2+ 1+(1+ )2 ↵ of asset 1 and
sells an equal amount of asset 2. Agent 2 trades the same amounts in the opposite
direction. The ex-ante expected utility of both agents is given by
U⇡ := U   a
2
 ↵2   a
2
 2,
where
  :=
 2
2[1 + (1 +  )2]
.
By going long in one asset and short in the other, agents can transfer consumption
between the events {s1, s2} and {s3, s4}. Thus they are able to partially insure
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the ↵-shock. The proportion of the potential welfare gain from insuring this shock,
a
2↵
2, that is not realized in equilibrium is given by  . In other words, a2 ↵
2 is
the magnitude of the unrealized welfare gain from trading the ↵-shock. Notice that
  2 (0, 12) and is strictly increasing in  . As   tends to zero, risk sharing relative to
the ↵-shock approaches the first-best, i.e. full insurance. On the other hand, agents
are not able to insure the  -shock at all, since that would require them to trade the
assets in one direction in the event {s1, s2} and the opposite direction in the event
{s3, s4}. Since the equilibrium relative price of the assets is 1, it is not optimal to
insure the  -shock in one of these events at the cost of exacerbating it in the other.
Given the information structure ⇡ˆ, markets are complete conditional on  .12
There is a unique equilibrium in which the consumption of each agent, conditional
on  , is riskless. The consumption of agent 1 is !   ↵ and ! + ↵ in  1 and  2
respectively, while for agent 2 it is the other way around. The ex-ante expected
utility of both agents is given by
U⇡ˆ := U   a
2
↵2.
Since ⇡ˆ reveals the ↵-shock, this risk cannot be shared in equilibrium; hence the
utility loss a2↵
2 relative to the first-best. On the other hand, agents can trade the
assets in opposite directions in the events {s1, s2} and {s3, s4}, which allows them to
fully insure the  -shock. The equilibrium welfare gain from changing the information
structure from ⇡ to ⇡ˆ is
U⇡ˆ   U⇡ =  a
2
(1  )↵2 + a
2
 2.
The Hirshleifer e↵ect is captured by the term a2(1  )↵2, which is equal to the welfare
loss, relative to the ⇡-equilibrium, arising from agents’ inability under ⇡ˆ to share the
↵-shock.13 The second term a2 
2 is the magnitude of the Blackwell e↵ect, the welfare
gain from being able to trade the  -shock under ⇡ˆ, which was not possible under
⇡. The Hirshleifer e↵ect is increasing in ↵ and decreasing in  , while the Blackwell
12In this example, the release of information leads to an increase in the asset span (conditional
on  ), and is thus analogous to the introduction of new assets. This is not the case in general,
however. For example, for information structures in ⇧0 (which is a generic subset of the set of all
information structures ⇧), i.e. those for which the conditional distribution over S has full support
for every realization of the signal, the asset span conditional on the signal is the same for every
realization and equal to the asset span with no information.
13As mentioned in footnote 1, the Hirshleifer e↵ect can be interpreted in terms of changes in
equilibrium prices induced by the change in information. In the present example, agents face two
budget constraints, one for each value of  . Under ⇡, these constraints are identical, and hence
reduce to a single budget constraint which allows agents to transfer wealth between the events
{s1, s2} and {s3, s4}. The change in information from ⇡ to ⇡ˆ causes equilibrium prices to diverge in
the two events, resulting in two distinct budget constraints. Agents cannot transfer wealth between
these events without violating one of the budget constraints. In Hirshleifer’s original two-state
example, each of the two events consists of a single state; thus in each event the budget set faced
by an agent is trivial, containing only the agent’s endowment in that event.
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e↵ect is increasing in  . For su ciently large ↵ and/or su ciently small   and  ,
the Hirshleifer e↵ect dominates the Blackwell e↵ect, and both agents are worse o↵.
Next consider the information structure ⇡ˆ0. As with ⇡ˆ, markets are complete
conditional on  . Again there is a unique equilibrium, with riskless consumption for
both agents conditional on  . Ex-ante expected utility is given by
U⇡ˆ0 := U   a2  
2.
Since ⇡ˆ0 reveals the  -shock, this risk cannot be traded in equilibrium; hence the
utility loss a2 
2 compared to the first-best. On the other hand, the ↵-shock can be
smoothed out completely. The equilibrium welfare gain from changing the informa-
tion structure from ⇡ to ⇡ˆ0 is
U⇡ˆ0   U⇡ = a2  ↵
2.
It consists of only one term, which is equal to the unrealized welfare gain from trading
the ↵-shock under ⇡. This is the Blackwell e↵ect. The Hirshleifer e↵ect is zero in
this case. While agents are unable to insure the  -shock under ⇡ˆ0, due to this shock
being revealed prior to trading, it was not insurable even under the uninformative
information structure ⇡, because of the structure of asset payo↵s. Clearly both agents
are better o↵ under ⇡ˆ0 for all values of ↵,   and  .
Let us assume that the parameters ↵,   and   are such that the Hirshleifer
e↵ect dominates the Blackwell e↵ect under ⇡ˆ. Comparing competitive equilibrium
allocations before and after the release of information, we see that agents are ex-ante
worse o↵ under ⇡ˆ, and ex-ante better o↵ under ⇡ˆ0, relative to the ⇡-equilibrium. We
now consider what a hypothetical planner is able to achieve, when he is restricted by
the same feasibility condition as competitive markets, i.e.
P
h y
h
  = 0 for all  , and
has access to the same information. We show that, for both ⇡ˆ and ⇡ˆ0, the planner
can attain an allocation that is Pareto improving ex-post (i.e. conditional on both
values of  ), and hence also ex-ante.14
Under ⇡ˆ, the planner can improve ex-post upon the ⇡-equilibrium by assigning
to each agent the sum of his ⇡ˆ-equilibrium and ⇡-equilibrium portfolios, for both
values of  . He is thus able to exploit the Blackwell e↵ect (in this case, insuring the
 -shock) just as competitive markets can under ⇡ˆ, while also insuring the ↵-shock
to the extent that competitive markets can under ⇡. Under ⇡ˆ0, the competitive
equilibrium is itself an ex-post (not just ex-ante) Pareto improvement relative to the
⇡-equilibrium. Clearly the ⇡ˆ0-equilibrium allocation is feasible for the planner as well
(though he cannot improve upon it since it is ex-post e cient).
14The first-best allocation in which both agents have a riskless consumption of ! is a feasible
allocation under both ⇡ˆ and ⇡ˆ0, and is an ex-ante Pareto improvement relative to the ⇡-equilibrium.
However, it is not in general an ex-post Pareto improvement. The ex-post expected utility of both
agents at this allocation is U for both values of  . One can verify that, under ⇡ˆ, the expected
utility of agent 1 conditional on  2 is higher than U , for su ciently small  . Similarly, under ⇡ˆ
0,
the expected utility of agent 1 conditional on  1 is higher than U , for   su ciently small relative
to  .
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To summarize, when markets are incomplete, the release of information expands
the set of achievable utility levels via the Blackwell e↵ect. The planner can take
advantage of this and so can competitive markets. At the same time, the release of
information can impair risk sharing due to the Hirshleifer e↵ect, by precluding the
sharing of risks that have already been resolved. The planner is not subject to this
e↵ect since the initial equilibrium allocation remains feasible even after the arrival
of information. The example suggests that while equilibrium welfare e↵ects can go
in either direction, depending on the nature of the information being released, the
planner can achieve an ex-post (hence also ex-ante) Pareto improvement for any
increase in information.
In the remainder of the paper we extend the analysis to a general economy wherein
we consider the e↵ects of arbitrary changes in information. In the case of non-
ordered information structures, welfare changes cannot be interpreted in terms of the
Blackwell and Hirshleifer e↵ects. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the findings
of the example remain valid. In Theorem 1 we establish that, for any change in
information, an ex-post welfare improvement can generically be attained by tailoring
agents’ portfolios to the new information structure. An additional welfare e↵ect arises
in equilibrium because of the adjustment in asset prices induced by the change in
information; we show in Theorem 2 that this may have a positive or negative e↵ect
on welfare. More precisely we show that, for a generic economy, there is a change in
information that makes all agents (ex-ante) better o↵ as well as a change that makes
all agents worse o↵. Identifying the set of information changes that lead to a welfare
improvement (or worsening) is not possible, however, at the level of generality of this
result; clearly such a characterization can be obtained only under strong restrictions
on the environment as in the example. We combine Theorems 1 and 2 in Corollary 1
to argue that the conclusions drawn from the example, summarized at the end of the
previous paragraph, have generic validity, i.e. competitive markets typically do not
respond to changes in information in a way that is welfare-improving even though it
is feasible to do so.
4 Attainable Changes in Welfare
In this section we consider allocations attainable by a hypothetical planner who
is subject to the same asset market and informational constraints as agents. We
say that an allocation (cˆ0, yˆ) :=
 
cˆh0 , yˆ
h
 
 
h2H, 2⌃ is feasible if
P
h cˆ
h
0  =
P
h !
h
0 andP
h yˆ
h
  = 0, for all   2 ⌃.
Note that a feasible allocation is defined as an allocation contingent on  , and
is therefore trivially measurable with respect to the information available to agents.
Moreover, since all signals have the same set of possible realizations ⌃, allocations
that are measurable with respect to ⇡ˆ are the same as those that are measurable
with respect to ⇡. Thus a change in information does not a↵ect the set of feasible
allocations. However, it does a↵ect the set of attainable utility levels: the value to
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an agent of making his consumption conditional on   depends on the information
conveyed by it. For example, if ⇡ is uninformative and ⇡ˆ induces a partition over S,
under ⇡ nothing is gained by (nontrivially) conditioning on  , but under ⇡ˆ this is
typically not true for values of   associated with distinct cells of the partition. Even
if ⇡ˆ does not induce a partition, it is in general beneficial to condition on   as long
as the conditional distribution over S varies with  .
Given a ⇡-equilibrium, if no welfare improvement is feasible under the new infor-
mation structure ⇡ˆ, i.e. when agents evaluate consumption using the beliefs deter-
mined by ⇡ˆ, we say that the ⇡-equilibrium is ⇡ˆ-e cient. As in the example in the
previous section, this gives rise to two welfare notions according to whether agents
evaluate allocations ex-ante or ex-post, i.e. before or after the observation of the
signal. Formally:
Definition 2 A ⇡-equilibrium (y, p) is ex-ante ⇡ˆ-e cient if there does not exist a
feasible allocation (cˆ0, yˆ) that ex-ante Pareto dominates the ⇡-equilibrium allocation,
given the information structure ⇡ˆ, i.e.X
s, 
⇡ˆs 
⇣
uh0
⇥
cˆh0 
⇤
+ uh
⇥
!hs + rs · yˆh 
⇤  uh0⇥!h0   p  · yh ⇤  uh⇥!hs + rs · yh ⇤⌘   0,
for all h 2 H, where at least one of these inequalities is strict.
Definition 3 A ⇡-equilibrium (y, p) is ex-post ⇡ˆ-e cient if there does not exist a
feasible allocation (cˆ0, yˆ) that ex-post Pareto dominates the ⇡-equilibrium allocation,
given the information structure ⇡ˆ, i.e.X
s
⇡ˆs 
⇣
uh0
⇥
cˆh0 
⇤
+ uh
⇥
!hs + rs · yˆh 
⇤  uh0⇥!h0   p  · yh ⇤  uh⇥!hs + rs · yh ⇤⌘   0,
for all h 2 H and   2 ⌃, where at least one of these inequalities is strict.
Notice that both the allocations (c0, y) and (cˆ0, yˆ) are evaluated at the same odds,
given by ⇡ˆ.15
It is well-known (Diamond (1967)) that competitive equilibria of a two-period,
single-good economy with incomplete markets are (ex-post) constrained Pareto e -
cient. Thus, in our terminology, ⇡-equilibria are ex-post ⇡-e cient. This condition
can be characterized in terms of the equality of agents’ marginal rates of substitution
between assets and period 0 consumption, for every  , i.e.P
s ⇡s  u
h0⇥!hs + rs · yh ⇤ rjs
uh0
0⇥
!h0   p  · yh 
⇤ = Ps ⇡s  uh˘0⇥!h˘s + rs · yh˘ ⇤ rjs
uh˘0
0⇥
!h˘0   p  · yh˘ 
⇤ , 8h, h˘ 2 H; j 2 J ;   2 ⌃.
(3)
15It would not be sensible to evaluate (c0, y) at ⇡, and (cˆ0, yˆ) at ⇡ˆ. Doing so can lead to the
possibility of a “Pareto improvement” with no change in the allocation (unless the allocation under
consideration is  -invariant for any given s).
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This means that, if there is no change in information, an ex-post welfare-improving
reallocation of portfolios cannot be found. In this sense, competitive markets make
e cient use of the available information. In contrast, we show that if markets are
incomplete ⇡-equilibria are generically ex-post ⇡ˆ-ine cient, for every ⇡ˆ 2 ⇧ˆ(⇡). In
other words, while a competitive equilibrium makes e cient use of the available
information, a Pareto improvement can typically be achieved for any change in in-
formation.
We begin by verifying that incompleteness is necessary for this result. When
markets are complete (and the initial information structure has full support), at a
competitive equilibrium there are no further gains from trade, whatever the change
in agents’ information is. Hence no portfolio reallocation can be found that allows
an improvement in agents’ welfare.
Lemma 1 Suppose markets are complete and (⇡, ⇡ˆ) is an admissible pair of infor-
mation structures with ⇡ 2 ⇧0. Then every ⇡-equilibrium is ex-post ⇡ˆ-e cient.
Proof :
If markets are complete and ⇡ 2 ⇧0, condition (3) for the ⇡-e ciency of a ⇡-
equilibrium (y, p) is equivalent to the equality of agents’ marginal rates of intertem-
poral substitution for every  :
uh
0⇥
!hs + rs · yh 
⇤
uh0
0⇥
!h0   p  · yh 
⇤ = uh˘0⇥!h˘s + rs · yh˘ ⇤
uh˘0
0⇥
!h˘0   p  · yh˘ 
⇤ , 8h, h˘ 2 H; s 2 S⇡( );   2 ⌃. (4)
Since S⇡ˆ( ) ⇢ S⇡( ) = S for all  , condition (4), and hence also (3), must in fact hold
when ⇡ is replaced by ⇡ˆ. Therefore, the ⇡-equilibrium (y, p) is ex-post ⇡ˆ-e cient,
and this is true for all ⇡ˆ 2 ⇧ˆ(⇡). 2
When markets are incomplete, condition (3) still holds at a ⇡-equilibrium, but
does not imply (4). In fact for a generic economy competitive equilibria are Pareto
ine cient, so that (4) does not hold (this is a standard result; see, for example, Magill
and Quinzii (1996)). We now show that, in addition, a ⇡-equilibrium is generically
ex-post ⇡ˆ-ine cient, i.e. condition (3) is violated when ⇡ is replaced by ⇡ˆ, indeed for
any ⇡ˆ 2 ⇧ˆ(⇡). Intuitively, when we change ⇡ to ⇡ˆ, (3) continues to hold only under
restrictive conditions on agents’ marginal utilities for state-contingent consumption.
These conditions are not satisfied for a generic economy. We prove the result under
the assumption that the asset payo↵ matrix R is in general position, i.e. every J ⇥J
submatrix of R is nonsingular.16
Theorem 1 Suppose markets are incomplete and R is in general position. Suppose
further that (⇡, ⇡ˆ) is an admissible pair of information structures such that at least
one element of the pair (⇡, ⇡ˆ) lies in ⇧0. Then there is a generic subset of ⌦ such
that every ⇡-equilibrium is ex-post ⇡ˆ-ine cient.
16General position is a generic property of the set of S ⇥ J matrices, for S   J .
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Theorem 1 allows for arbitrary changes in information,17 including those that
entail an increase or decrease in the support of the information structure.18 In
particular, it implies that generically an increase in information generates additional
gains from trade, so that agents would trade again if asset markets were to reopen
after the increase in information. This idea is developed more fully in Gottardi and
Rahi (2012), which provides several extensions of Theorem 1 in the specific context
of retrading after the arrival of information. However, Theorem 1 su ces for our
present purpose, which is to contrast welfare changes in equilibrium to those that
can be achieved by a planner.
5 Equilibrium Changes in Welfare
We have shown that, for any ⇡-equilibrium, and for any change in information from
⇡ to ⇡ˆ, generically there is a feasible allocation that is ex-post Pareto improving.
While this is no longer true if we restrict attention to feasible allocations that are
also ⇡ˆ-equilibrium allocations, we show in this section that generically there exists
an information structure ⇡ˇ and a corresponding ⇡ˇ-equilibrium such that all agents
are better o↵ ex-ante. But there also exists a ⇡ˇ0 and a corresponding ⇡ˇ0-equilibrium
such that all agents are worse o↵. Indeed, the e↵ect of a change in information on
equilibrium welfare can be in any direction. Unlike the welfare changes considered
in the previous section, the change in equilibrium welfare is attributable not only to
the e↵ect of the change in information on the available gains from trade, but also to
the e↵ect of this change on equilibrium asset prices. The proof of this result exploits
the general framework laid out in Citanna et al. (1998), and exposited more fully in
Villanacci et al. (2002), Chapter 15, to analyze the e↵ect on equilibrium welfare of
perturbing a parameter of the economy.
Given a ⇡-equilibrium (y, p), and a ⇡ˆ-equilibrium (yˆ, pˆ), let W (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ; y, p) be
the vector of di↵erences in the ex-ante expected utilities of agents between the two
equilibria. This vector is given by(X
s, 
⇡ˆs 
⇣
uh0
⇥
!h0   pˆ  · yˆh 
⇤
+ uh
⇥
!hs + rs · yˆh 
⇤  uh0⇥!h0   p  · yh ⇤  uh⇥!hs + rs · yh ⇤⌘
)
h2H
We consider local changes in (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ) in a neighborhood of (y, p, ⇡). An ex-ante Pareto
improvement is attained in equilibrium ifW (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ; y, p) is nonnegative and nonzero.
We show in fact that for a generic economy, for any vector in RH , there exists a ⇡ˆ
and a corresponding equilibrium (yˆ, pˆ) such that the change in equilibrium welfare
given by W (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ; y, p) is equal to the specified vector. In other words, it is possible
17The assumption that either ⇡ or ⇡ˆ has full support is just a matter of convenience. The result
holds even if neither has full support, provided a2 and the market incompleteness condition apply
for the relevant subset of S.
18Notice that an ex-post Pareto improvement can typically be attained even if ⇡ˆ resolves all the
uncertainty in the economy, since there is still room for intertemporal reallocation of consumption.
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to choose ⇡ˆ in order to generate a local change in welfare in any direction. Our result
requires that markets be su ciently incomplete, and that the heterogeneity of agents
not be too large.
Theorem 2 Suppose S   2JH, J   H   1, and R is in general position. Then,
for a generic subset of E , for any ⇡-equilibrium (y, p), there exists a local change in
information d⇡ˆ satisfying (⇡ + d⇡ˆ) 2 ⇧ˆ(⇡), and a corresponding local change in the
equilibrium (dyˆ, dpˆ), such that W (y + dyˆ, p+ dpˆ, ⇡ + d⇡ˆ; y, p) is any desired nonzero
vector in RH .
We can now summarize the sense in which Theorems 1 and 2 generalize the
example in Section 3.
Corollary 1 Suppose S   2JH, J   H 1, and R is in general position. Then, for
any (u, ⇡) in a generic subset of UH⇥⇧, there is a generic subset of ⌦ such that for
any ⇡-equilibrium, there exist ⇡ˆ and ⇡ˆ0 in ⇧ˆ(⇡) for which the following statements
hold:
i. There is a ⇡ˆ-equilibrium at which all agents are worse o↵ ex-ante.
ii. There is a ⇡ˆ0-equilibrium at which all agents are better o↵ ex-ante.
iii. The ⇡-equilibrium is ex-post ⇡ˆ-ine cient as well as ex-post ⇡ˆ0-ine cient.
The proof, which is in the Appendix, is not an immediate consequence of Theorems
1 and 2. For a given economy (!, u, ⇡) in the generic subset for which Theorem 2
applies, statements (i) and (ii) of the corollary hold. However, the generic subset of
endowments for which statement (iii) holds, given by Theorem 1, may not contain
!. An additional argument is required to establish the result.
Corollary 1 tells us, in particular, that while there is (almost) always a change in
information that makes all agents worse o↵ in equilibrium, for the same change in
information there is a feasible allocation at which all agents are better o↵ (even ex-
post). Thus, while competitive markets make e cient use of the available information
(in the sense of being constrained e cient for a given information structure), they
typically do not deal with changes in information in a welfare-enhancing manner
even though it is feasible to do so.
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A Appendix
In our analysis we use the following shorthand notation for matrices. Given an index
set N with typical element n, and a collection {zn}n2N of vectors or matrices, we
denote by diagn2N [zn] the (block) diagonal matrix with typical entry zn, where n
varies across all elements of N . For a given vector or matrix z, diagn2N [z] is then
the diagonal matrix with the term z repeated #N times. In similar fashion, we write
[. . . zn . . .n2N ] to denote the row block with typical element zn, and analogously for
column blocks. We drop reference to the index set if it is obvious from the context:
for example diagh2H is shortened to diagh, and [. . . zs . . .s2S,s 6=s1 ] to [. . . zs . . .s 6=s1 ]. We
use the same symbol 0 for the zero scalar and the zero matrix; in the latter case we
occasionally indicate the dimension in order to clarify the argument. We denote by
IN the N ⇥N identity matrix. A “⇤” stands for any term whose value is immaterial
to the analysis. We will sometimes need to order the set S (and similarly the sets ⌃
and H) as {s1, s2, . . .}, s1 being the first state, and so on.
We begin by providing a characterization of competitive equilibria. The first-
order conditions for the utility-maximization program (1) are:X
s
⇡s 
⇣
uh
0⇥
!hs + rs · yh 
⇤
rs   uh0 0
⇥
!h0   p  · yh 
⇤
p 
⌘
= 0, 8h 2 H;   2 ⌃. (5)
The tuple (y, p) is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it satisfies equations (2)
and (5). Let ⇡  := {⇡s }s2S, and define
f (y , p ,!, u, ⇡
 ) :=
X
s
⇡s 
⇣
uh
0⇥
!hs + rs · yh 
⇤
rs   uh0 0
⇥
!h0   p  · yh 
⇤
p 
⌘
, 8h 2 H,
g (y ) :=
X
h
yh .
Then the equations that characterize a competitive equilibrium, (2) and (5), can be
written as
F (y , p ,!, u, ⇡
 ) :=
✓
f (y , p ,!, u, ⇡ )
g (y )
◆
= 0, 8  2 ⌃, (6)
or more compactly as
F (y, p,!, u, ⇡) :=
✓
f(y, p,!, u, ⇡)
g(y)
◆
= 0, (7)
where f := {f } 2⌃, and g := {g } 2⌃. Here the endogenous variables are (y, p),
while (!, u, ⇡) are parameters.19
19For ease of notation, we will often drop parameters that remain fixed and play no role in
the argument at hand. For example, in the proof of Theorem 2, we write F (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ) instead of
F (yˆ, pˆ,!, u, ⇡ˆ).
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Suppose ⇡ 2 ⇧0. Consider the equilibrium system (6) for a given value of  .
These are JH + J equations, equal to the number of unknowns (y, p). The Jacobian
of this equation system can be written as follows:
Dy  ,p  ,!F  =
✓
Dy  ,p f  D!f 
Dy  ,p g  0
◆
,
with
D!f  = diagh
h
. . . ⇡s  u
h00⇥!hs + rs · yh ⇤ rs . . .si
and
Dy  ,p g  = (. . . IJ . . .h 0).
The matrix D!f  has full row rank since R has full column rank and the term
⇡s uh
00
[!hs + rs · yh ] is nonzero, for all h, s, . Clearly, Dy  ,p g  has full row rank as
well (indeed, Dy g  has full row rank). By a standard argument, for a generic subset
of endowments ⌦R , the number of equilibria conditional on   (zeros of F ) is finite,
and positive. Hence, for endowments in the generic subset ⌦R := \ 2⌃⌦R , the
number of equilibria (zeros of F ) is finite as well.
Since we exploit the transversality theorem repeatedly in the proofs below, it is
useful to summarize the argument at the outset. Consider a function : Rn ⇥ E ! Rm,
m > n. For e 2 E , let  e be the function  (·, e). The argument involves identifying
such a function  , such that the desired result can be formulated as   1e (0) = ?, for
every e in a generic subset of E . We show that the Jacobian Dx,e has full row rank
at all zeros (x, e) of  , i.e.  is transverse to zero. By the transversality theorem,
there is then a dense subset Eˆ of E such that, for each e 2 Eˆ ,  e : Rn ! Rm is
transverse to zero. It follows that   1e (0) = ?. In other words, the equation system
 e(x) = 0 has no solution since the number of (locally) independent equations m
exceeds the number of unknowns n. A standard argument (see, for example, Citanna
et al. (1998)) establishes that the set Eˆ is open, and hence a generic subset of E .
In order to economize on notation, we use the shorthand uh0 
0
:= uh0
0⇥
!h0   p  · yh 
⇤
,
uhs 
0
:= uh
0⇥
!hs + rs · yh 
⇤
, and similarly for the second derivatives, uh0 
00
and uhs 
00
.
Proof of Theorem 1:
A ⇡-equilibrium (y, p) is ex-post ⇡ˆ-e cient if and only if the marginal rates of sub-
stitution between assets and period 0 consumption, evaluated at ⇡ˆ, are equal across
agents, for every  , i.e. condition (3) holds with ⇡ replaced by ⇡ˆ. Letting
µhh˘  (y , p ) :=
uh0 
0
uh˘0 
0 ,
we can rewrite this condition as follows:X
s
⇡ˆs 
⇣
uhs 
0   µhh˘  uh˘s 
0⌘
rjs = 0, 8h, h˘ 2 H; j 2 J ;   2 ⌃. (8)
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Fix a   for which {⇡ˆs }s2S is not proportional to {⇡s }s2S. We will show that a
Pareto improvement can be achieved conditional on every   with this property.
We assume that ⇡ 2 ⇧0 in the following argument, outlining in the last paragraph
of the proof how it extends to the case where ⇡ does not have full support. Let
R⇤ :=
⇣
diags[⇡ˆs ]R diags[⇡s ]R
⌘
.
We claim that rank(R⇤)   J +1. If S⇡ˆ( ) = S, this is immediate from the following
result in Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell (1989) (Step 4, page 31):
Fact Suppose markets are incomplete, and R is in general position. Consider
nonzero scalars ✓s, ✓0s, s 2 S, such that {✓s}s2S is not proportional to {✓0s}s2S. Then,
diags[✓s]R and diags[✓
0
s]R do not have the same column span.
On the other hand, if S⇡ˆ( ) ( S, R⇤ is row-equivalent to
Rˆ⇤ :=
 
diags2S⇡ˆ( )[⇡ˆs ]R1
   diags2S⇡ˆ( )[⇡s ]R1———————————————————
0
   diags/2S⇡ˆ( )[⇡s ]R2
!
,
where R1 consists of the rows of R corresponding to the states in S⇡ˆ( ), while R2
consists of the remaining rows. If we delete the rows of Rˆ⇤ corresponding to the
redundant rows of its upper left block, and also delete the rows corresponding to the
redundant rows of its lower right block, we are left with a block-triangular matrix
whose diagonal blocks have full row rank, and hence whose rank is equal to the
sum of the ranks of the diagonal blocks. It follows that for the full matrix Rˆ⇤,
rank(Rˆ⇤)   rank(R1) + rank(R2), which is at least J + 1 due to the general position
of R. Consequently, rank(R⇤) = rank(Rˆ⇤)   J + 1.
Let rj 2 RS be the payo↵ of asset j. Since rank(R⇤)   J + 1, we can pick j such
that diags[⇡ˆs ] r
j lies outside the column span of diags[⇡s ]R, and hence the matrix✓
. . . ⇡ˆs  rjs . . .s
. . . ⇡s  rs . . .s
◆
(9)
has full row rank J + 1.
We will show that, for a generic subset of ⌦, there is no solution to the equation
system
 1(y , p ,!; ⇡
 , ⇡ˆ ) :=
 
F (y , p ,!; ⇡ )P
s ⇡ˆs 
⇣
uh1s 
0   µh1h2  uh2s 0
⌘
rjs
!
= 0,
i.e. the ex-post ⇡ˆ-e ciency condition (8) is violated. The Jacobian of  1 is
Dy  ,p  ,! 1 =
0BB@
⇤    diagh⇥. . . ⇡s  uhs 00rs . . .s⇤
—————————————————
Dy  ,p g 
   0
—————————————————
⇤    ⇥. . . ⇡ˆs  uh1s 00rjs . . .s⇤ ⇤
1CCA
,
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which is row-equivalent to0BBBB@
⇤    . . . ⇡ˆs  uh1s 00rjs . . .s    ⇤
———————————————————————————
⇤    . . . ⇡s  uh1s 00rs . . .s    0
———————————————————————————
⇤    0    diagh 6=h1⇥. . . ⇡s  uhs 00rs . . .s⇤———————————————————————————
Dy  ,p g 
   0    0
1CCCCA
.
This matrix is in turn column-equivalent to0BBB@
⇤
    ⇤     ✓ . . . ⇡ˆs  rjs . . .s
. . . ⇡s  rs . . .s
◆
————————————————————————————
⇤    diagh 6=h1⇥. . . ⇡s  uhs 00rs . . .s⇤    0————————————————————————————
Dy  ,p g 
   0    0
1CCCA
.
(10)
This is a block-triangular matrix. The top right block is the same as (9) which has
full row rank. The other two diagonal blocks of (10) have full row rank as well, by
the properties of ⇡-equilibria established at the beginning of the Appendix. Hence
the matrix (10) has full row rank.
We have shown that the Jacobian Dy  ,p  ,! 1 has full row rank, at every zero of
 1. Thus  1 is transverse to zero, and  
 1
1! (0) = ?, for every ! in a generic subset
of ⌦.
In this proof we assumed that ⇡ 2 ⇧0. If not, then ⇡ˆ 2 ⇧0, due to the as-
sumption in the theorem that at least one of these information structures has full
support. Then rank(R⇤)   J+1 by the same argument as above, swapping the roles
of ⇡ and ⇡ˆ. Dropping any assets that are redundant with respect to the states in
S⇡( ), let y˘  and p˘  be the portfolios and prices of the remaining assets. The above
argument shows that, for a generic subset of ⌦, there is no solution to the equation
system  1(y˘ , p˘ ,!; ⇡ , ⇡ˆ
 ) = 0. In particular, Dy˘  ,p˘  ,!F  has full row rank, and
consequently so does Dy˘  ,p˘  ,! 1. This establishes the result. 2
Proof of Theorem 2:
We fix an economy e = (!, u, ⇡) 2 ⌦⇥UH ⇥⇧0, and consider a ⇡-equilibrium (y, p).
Thus F (y, p, ⇡) = 0. We consider (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ) in a neighborhood of (y, p, ⇡) such that
(yˆ, pˆ) is a ⇡ˆ-equilibrium, i.e. F (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ) = 0.
Let
 (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ; y, p, ⇡) :=
0@ W (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ; y, p)F (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ) P
  ⇡ˆs    ⇡s
 
s2S
1A
.
Notice that  (y, p, ⇡; y, p, ⇡) = 0. As we vary (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ) in a neighborhood of (y, p, ⇡)
we move locally along the equilibrium manifold. The theorem is established by show-
ing that the Jacobian of   with respect to (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ) has full row rank at (yˆ, pˆ, ⇡ˆ) =
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(y, p, ⇡), i.e. Dyˆ,pˆ,⇡ˆ (y, p, ⇡; y, p, ⇡) has full row rank. This full rank property im-
plies that there is a local change (dyˆ, dpˆ, d⇡ˆ) such that d (y, p, ⇡; y, p, ⇡) is any de-
sired vector. In particular, (dyˆ, dpˆ, d⇡ˆ) can be chosen so that dW (y, p, ⇡; y, p) :=
W (y + dyˆ, p+ dpˆ, ⇡ + d⇡ˆ; y, p) is any desired nonzero vector in RH , dF (y, p, ⇡) :=
F (y + dyˆ, p+ dpˆ, ⇡ + d⇡ˆ) = 0, and
P
  d⇡ˆs  = 0 for all s 2 S. The condition dF = 0
ensures that (y + dyˆ, p + dpˆ) is a (⇡ + d⇡ˆ)-equilibrium. The condition
P
  d⇡ˆs  = 0
implies that (⇡ + d⇡ˆ) satisfies condition a1 in the definition of the set ⇧ˆ(⇡). Con-
dition a2 in this definition must also be satisfied, for otherwise there is no change
in the equilibrium allocation and consequently no change in welfare. Therefore,
(⇡ + d⇡ˆ) 2 ⇧ˆ(⇡).
The matrix Dyˆ,pˆ,⇡ˆ (y, p, ⇡; y, p, ⇡) is given by0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
0
     
...
. . .  ⇡ uh0 0 yh > . . . 
...h
      0
———————————————————————————————————–
⇤
      ⇤
      diag 
0BB@
...
. . .
⇣
uhs 
0
rs   uh0 0 p 
⌘
. . .s
...h
1CCA
———————————————————————————————————–
diag [. . . IJ . . .h]
   0    0
———————————————————————————————————–
0
   0    . . . IS . . . 
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
.
The top left block is zero because of the first-order condition (5). This matrix is
row/column-equivalent to0BBBBBBB@
...
. . . uh0 
0
yh 
>
. . . 
...h
      0
      0
—————————————————————
0
   diag [. . . IJ . . .h]    0
—————————————————————⇤    ⇤    Q(y)
1CCCCCCCA
,
(11)
where
Q(y) :=
0BBBBB@
diag 
0BB@
...
. . .
⇣
uhs 
0
rs   uh0 0 p 
⌘
. . .s
...h
1CCA
—————————————————
. . . IS . . . 
1CCCCCA
.
(12)
Later in the Appendix we show that, for every competitive equilibrium of a generic
economy, under the dimensionality restrictions in the statement of the theorem, the
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portfolios and marginal utilities of agents satisfy the following conditions:20
C1. The vectors {yh }h2H,h 6=h˘ are linearly independent, for all h, h˘ 2 H and   2 ⌃.
C2. The vectors (. . . uh10 
0
. . . ) and (. . . u
h2
0 
0
. . . ) are not collinear.21
C3. Q(y) has full row rank.
Each of these conditions holds for a di↵erent generic subset of E (see Lemmas A.1, A.3
and A.5). In the remainder of the proof, we assume that the economy e considered
in the foregoing analysis is in the intersection of these three generic subsets. Thus
e is a generic economy for which conditions C1, C2 and C3 hold. We will prove
that, for such an economy, (11) has full row rank, and hence so does the Jacobian
Dyˆ,pˆ,⇡ˆ (y, p, ⇡; y, p, ⇡).22
Since (11) is a block-triangular matrix, it su ces to show full row rank of the
three diagonal blocks. The middle block clearly has full row rank. The bottom right
block Q(y) has full row rank due to C3.
It remains to show that the top left block of (11) has full row rank. The last
H   1 rows of this block are linearly independent by condition C1. We claim that
the first row is not in the span of the last H   1 rows. Suppose not. Then the first
row [. . . uh10 
0
yh1 
>
. . . ] can be written as a unique linear combination of the remaining
rows {[. . . uh0 0 yh >. . . ]}h 6=h1 , i.e. there exist unique coe cients { h}h 6=h1 such that
yh1  =
X
h 6=h1
 h
uh0 
0
uh10 
0 y
h
 , 8  2 ⌃.
By the market-clearing condition, this linear combination must in fact be yh1  =
 Ph 6=h1 yh , for all  . It follows that the ratio uh10 0/uh20 0 is  -invariant, violating con-
dition C2. 2
In the remainder of the Appendix we establish conditions C1, C2 and C3, that
were used in the proof of Theorem 2, for a generic subset of E , and provide a proof
of Corollary 1.
Lemma A.1 Suppose J   H   1 and ⇡ 2 ⇧0. Then, for a generic subset ⌦Y of ⌦,
condition C1 is satisfied at any ⇡-equilibrium.
20The upper bound on the number of agents relative to the number of assets, J   H   1, is
clearly necessary for condition C1, which in turn is used in the proofs of conditions C2 and C3. In
addition, C2 and C3 rely on a property that agents’ marginal utilities for assets vary su ciently
with respect to ⇡, across both s and   (see Lemma A.2); a lower bound on the number of states,
S   J(H + 1) + 1, is needed to establish this property. Finally, the proof of condition C3 requires
a tighter lower bound on S, given by S   2JH.
21The choice of agents h1 and h2 is just a matter of convenience.
22Notice that, in order to establish the full rank property of D , we do not apply a transversality
argument to the map  , i.e. we do not perturb parameters of  . Instead, we use transversality to
show the generic validity of conditions C1, C2 and C3.
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Proof :
Without loss of generality we can take h˘ = h1. Consider the equation system
 2(y , p , 2,!) :=
0@ F (y , p ,!)[ . . . yh  . . .h 6=h1 ] 2
 >2  2   1
1A = 0,
where  2 2 RH 1, with typical element  2h, h 2 H, h 6= h1. Thus we have appended
J + 1 equations and H   1 unknowns to the equilibrium system F  = 0. Under the
dimensionality condition J   H  1, the number of equations exceeds the number of
unknowns, for given !. We will show that, for a generic subset of endowments, this
system has no solution, and hence the vectors {yh }h 6=h1 are linearly independent at
any equilibrium.
The Jacobian of  2 is
Dy  ,p  , 2,! 2 =
0BBBB@
Dy f 
   Dp f     0    D!f 
——————————————————————–
. . . IJ . . .h
   0    0    0
——————————————————————–
0 [. . . 2hIJ . . .h 6=h1 ]
   0    ⇤    0
——————————————————————–
0
   0    2 >2    0
1CCCCA
,
which is column-equivalent to0BBBB@
0
   ⇤    D!f 
————————————————————————–
⇤
     
 
IJ
   . . . IJ . . .h 6=h1
———————————
0
   . . . 2hIJ . . .h 6=h1
!
0
      0
————————————————————————–
2 >2
   0    0
1CCCCA
.
This is a block-triangular matrix. At any zero of  2,  2 6= 0 (since  >2  2 = 1), and
hence the bottom left and middle blocks have full row rank. Furthermore, D!f  also
has full row rank. It follows that the JacobianDy  ,p  , 2,! 2 has full row rank, at every
zero of  2. Thus  2 is transverse to zero, and  
 1
2! (0) = ? for all ! 2 ⌦Y  , a generic
subset of ⌦. The set ⌦Y in the statement of the lemma is given by ⌦Y := \ 2⌃⌦Y  .
2
In order to establish conditionsC2 andC3, we will need to independently perturb
the marginal utilities of agents for di↵erent signal realizations  . This cannot be
achieved via endowment perturbations, since endowments do not vary with respect to
 . Instead, we perturb the information structure ⇡. More precisely, at any ⇡ 2 ⇧0, we
consider derivatives with respect to the probabilities over S for two signal realizations
 1 and  2, i.e. with respect to ⇡1 := {⇡s 1}s2S and ⇡2 := {⇡s 2}s2S, along directions
that leave ⇡ 1 and ⇡ 2 unchanged. In particular this ensures that the perturbed
probabilities remain in ⇧0.
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We denote by ⇡ i the value of ⇡ i that remains fixed in such a perturbation (with
derivatives being evaluated at ⇡, this value is equal to
P
s ⇡s i). As a first step we
show in Lemma A.2 below that, for a generic subset of endowments, the Jacobian of
Z(y 1 , p 1 , y 2 , p 2 , ⇡
1, ⇡2,!) :=
0BB@
f 1(y 1 , p 1 , ⇡
1,!)P
s ⇡s 1   ⇡ 1
f 2(y 2 , p 2 , ⇡
2,!)P
s ⇡s 2   ⇡ 2
1CCA
with respect to ⇡1 and ⇡2 has full row rank at any equilibrium. Lemma A.2 is invoked
in all the lemmas that follow.23
Lemma A.2 Suppose S   J(H + 1) + 1, and R is in general position. Let ⇡ 2 ⇧0
be an information structure with
P
s ⇡s i = ⇡ i, i = 1, 2. Then, for a generic subset
⌦Z of ⌦, at any ⇡-equilibrium, D⇡1,⇡2Z has full row rank.
Proof :
For   =  1,  2, we have
f  =
X
s
⇡s  u
h0⇥!hs + rs · yh ⇤ rs   ⇡  uh0 0⇥!h0   p  · yh ⇤ p , h 2 H.
Therefore,
D⇡1,⇡2Z = diag 2{ 1, 2}
0BBBB@
...
. . . uhs 
0
rs . . .s
...h
———————
. . . 1 . . .s
1CCCCA
.
Let
   :=
0B@
...
. . . uhs 
0
rs . . .sJH+1
...h
1CA
and 1> := (1 1 . . . 1)1⇥(JH+1). We claim that, for a generic subset of ⌦, at a ⇡-
equilibrium, the square matrix
 ˘  :=
 
  
——–
1>
!
has full rank, i.e. for  3 2 RJH+1, there is no solution to
23The assumptions in the statement of Lemma A.2 are implied by those in the statements of
Lemmas A.3, A.4 and A.5.
25
 3(y , p , 3,!) :=
0BB@
F (y , p ,!)
  (y , p ,!) 3
1> 3
 >3  3   1
1CCA = 0.
The Jacobian, Dy  ,p  , 3,! 3, is row-equivalent to0BBBBB@
⇤
     ⇤      D! ✓ f     3
◆
—————————————————
0
     1> >3
     0
—————————————————
Dy  ,p g 
   0    0
1CCCCCA
.
(13)
We wish to show that this matrix has full row rank at any zero of  3. As we have
seen already, Dy  ,p g  has full row rank. Also,  3 is orthogonal to 1 and nonzero
(since  >3  3 = 1). Hence, due to the block-triangular structure of (13), it su ces to
show that the upper right block, given by
D!
✓
f 
    3
◆
=
0@ diagh⇥. . . ⇡s  uhs 00 rs . . .s⇤———————————————————
diagh
h 
. . . 3s uhs 
00
rs . . .sJH+1
 
(0 . . . 0)
i 1A
,
has full row rank. This matrix is row-equivalent to a block-diagonal matrix, with
blocks indexed by h. The h’th block is 
. . . ⇡s  uhs 
00
rs . . .sJH+1
   . . . ⇡s  uhs 00 rs . . .s>JH+1
——————————————————————–
. . . 3s uhs 
00
rs . . .sJH+1
   0
!
.
(14)
This matrix is block-triangular as well, and its upper right block has full row rank
since it has at least J columns and R is in general position. It remains to show
that the lower left block of (14) has full row rank. Let S¯ be the subset of states
for which  3s 6= 0. This is a nonempty subset at any zero of  3.24 Then we haveP
s2S¯  3su
h
s 
0
rs = 0. Since R is in general position, and uhs 
0
is nonzero for all s, we
must have #S¯   J + 1. Full row rank of the lower left block of (14) now follows
from the general position of R.
We have shown that the Jacobian Dy  ,p  , 3,! 3 has full row rank, at every zero
of  3. Thus  3 is transverse to zero, and  
 1
3! (0) = ? for all ! 2 ⌦Z , a generic
subset of ⌦. This establishes that  ˘  has full row rank. It follows that D⇡1,⇡2Z has
full row rank for the generic subset of endowments ⌦Z := ⌦Z 1\ ⌦Z 2 . 2
Lemma A.3 Suppose S   J(H + 1) + 1, J   H   1, and R is in general position.
Then, for a generic subset of ⌦⇥ ⇧, condition C2 is satisfied at any equilibrium.
24S¯ may depend on the zero of  3 we are considering, but this does not a↵ect our argument.
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Proof :
Let ⇡ 2 ⇧0. We restrict endowments to lie in the generic subset ⌦Y \ ⌦Z of ⌦ for
which condition C1 holds and D⇡1,⇡2Z has full row rank (see Lemmas A.1 and A.2),
and show that, for a generic subset of ⇧0, and hence of ⇧, there is no solution to
 4(y 1 , p 1 , y 2 , p 2 , ⇡
1, ⇡2) :=
0BBBB@
F 1(y 1 , p 1 , ⇡
1)
F 2(y 2 , p 2 , ⇡
2)P
s ⇡s 1   ⇡ 1P
s ⇡s 2   ⇡ 2
uh10 1
0
uh20 2
0   uh10 2
0
uh20 1
0
1CCCCA = 0.
The Jacobian, Dy 1 ,p 1 ,y 2 ,p 2 ,⇡1,⇡2 4, is row/column-equivalent to0BBBBB@
⇤    D⇡1,⇡2Z
———————————————————————————
Dy 1g 1 0 0
  
0 Dy 2g 2 0
    0
⇤ ⇤ Dp 1 , p 2
h
uh10 1
0
uh20 2
0   uh10 2
0
uh20 1
0i    
1CCCCCA
.
(15)
Furthermore,
Dp 1
h
uh10 1
0
uh20 2
0   uh10 2
0
uh20 1
0i
= uh10 2
0
uh20 1
00
yh2 1   uh10 1
00
uh20 2
0
yh1 1 ,
which is nonzero since yh1  is not collinear with y
h2
  by condition C1. Since Dy g  has
full row rank for all  , it follows that the lower left block of (15) has full row rank.
Since D⇡1,⇡2Z also has full row rank, the Jacobian Dy 1 ,p 1 ,y 2 ,p 2 ,⇡1,⇡2 4 has full row
rank. Thus  4 is transverse to zero, and  
 1
4⇡ (0) = ? for all ⇡ in a generic subset of
⇧0. 2
In order to establish condition C3, we will employ finite-dimensional perturba-
tions of agents’ period 1 utility functions. This procedure requires the following
result.
Lemma A.4 Suppose S   J(H + 1) + 1, and R is in general position. Then, for a
generic subset ⌦C⇥⇧C of ⌦⇥⇧, at any equilibrium, chsˆ ˆ 6= chsˇ ˇ for all (sˆ,  ˆ) 6= (sˇ,  ˇ),
and for all h 2 H.
Proof :
Consider first the case where sˆ 6= sˇ and  ˆ =  ˇ. Without loss of generality, we can
take sˆ = s1 and sˇ = s2, and prove the result for the first agent, h1, for a given  . We
will show that, for a generic subset of ⌦, there is no solution to
 5(y , p ,!) :=
✓
F (y , p ,!)
ch1s1    ch1s2 
◆
= 0.
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The Jacobian, Dy  ,p  ,! 5, is row-equivalent to0B@ ⇤
     D! ✓ f ch1s1    ch1s2 
◆
———————————————
Dy  ,p g 
   0
1CA
,
and
D!
✓
f 
ch1s1    ch1s2 
◆
=
 
diagh[. . . ⇡s  u
h
s 
00
rs . . .s]———————————–
1   1 01⇥(S 2)
   0
!
.
(16)
Note that the zero block in the lower right of (16) corresponds to all agents other
than h1. The matrix (16) is row-equivalent to
0BBB@
⇡s1  u
h1
s1 
00
rs1 ⇡s2  u
h1
s2 
00
rs2 [. . . ⇡s  u
h1
s 
00
rs . . .s>2]
     0
1  1 0   
——————————————————————————————————–
0
   diagh 6=h1 [. . . ⇡s  uhs 00 rs . . .s]
1CCCA
.
(17)
The lower right submatrix of (17) has full row rank since R has full column rank.
The (1, 3) block of the upper left submatrix of (17) also has full row rank due to the
general position of R (note that the assumed dimensionality condition implies that
S   J+2). Consequently, the whole matrix (17) has full row rank, and hence so does
(16). Furthermore, due to the full row rank of Dy  ,p g , the Jacobian Dy  ,p  ,! 5 has
full row rank as well. Thus  5 is transverse to 0, and  
 1
5! (0) = ? for all ! 2 ⌦1 , a
generic subset of ⌦. Let ⌦1 := \ 2⌃⌦1 .
Now consider the case where  ˆ 6=  ˇ, while sˆ may or may not be equal to sˇ.
Without loss of generality, we can take  ˆ =  1,  ˇ =  2, and sˆ = s1, and prove the
result for the first agent, h1. Let ⇡ 2 ⇧0. We restrict endowments to the generic
subset ⌦Z for which D⇡1,⇡2Z has full row rank (see Lemma A.2), and show that, for
a generic subset of ⇧0, and hence of ⇧, there is no solution to
 6(y 1 , p 1 , y 2 , p 2 , ⇡
1, ⇡2) :=
0BBBB@
F 1(y 1 , p 1 , ⇡
1)
F 2(y 2 , p 2 , ⇡
2)P
s ⇡s 1   ⇡ 1P
s ⇡s 2   ⇡ 2
ch1s1 1   ch1sˇ 2
1CCCCA = 0.
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The Jacobian, Dy 1 ,p 1 ,y 2 ,p 2 ,⇡1,⇡2 6, is row-equivalent to0BBBB@
⇤    D⇡1,⇡2Z
————————————————————————0B@ Dy 1 ,p 1
✓
ch1s1 1
g 1
◆      ⇤
———————————————–
0
   Dy 2 ,p 2g 2
1CA       0
1CCCCA
.
Since D⇡1,⇡2Z has full row rank, it su ces to show that the lower left block of the
above matrix has full row rank. This block is itself block-triangular, and Dy 2 ,p 2g 2
has full row rank. The other diagonal term, given by
Dy 1 ,p 1
✓
ch1s1 1
g 1
◆
=
 
r>s1
   01⇥J(H 1)    0
————————————
IJ
   . . . IJ . . .h 6=h1    0
!
,
also has full row rank since rs1 is nonzero by the general position of R.
It follows that the Jacobian Dy 1 ,p 1 ,y 2 ,p 2 ,⇡1,⇡2 6 has full row rank, at every zero
of  6. Thus  6 is transverse to zero, and  
 1
6⇡ (0) = ? for all ⇡ 2 ⇧C , a generic
subset of ⇧0. The set ⌦C in the statement of the lemma is given by ⌦C := ⌦1 \⌦Z .
2
The space of utility functions U is infinite-dimensional. For the genericity ar-
guments that we use in order to establish condition C3, it su ces to consider a
finite-dimensional submanifold of U . This submanifold consists of linear pertur-
bations of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index uh of each agent h in the
neighborhood of consumption in each state (s,  ), for a given equilibrium. This is a
standard construction (see, for example, Citanna et al. (1998)).25
Consider an economy (!ˇ, uˇ, ⇡ˇ) 2 ⌦C⇥ UH⇥⇧C , and a corresponding equilibrium
with period 1 consumption allocation {cˇhs }h2H,s2S, 2⌃. By Lemma A.4, the consump-
tion level of agent h, cˇhs , is distinct across (s,  ), for all h. Therefore, we can find
open intervals Bˇhs , B
h
s  such that cˇ
h
s  2 Bˇhs  ( Bhs  ⇢ R++, where the intervals Bhs 
are disjoint across (s,  ). Define C2 functions ⇢hs  : R++ ! [0, 1] such that ⇢hs  = 1
on Bˇhs  and ⇢
h
s  = 0 on the complement of B
h
s .
26 Now consider the class of utility
functions uh parametrized by ⌫h 2 RS⌃:
uh(c, ⌫h) := uˇh(c) +
X
s, 
⇢hs (c) ⌫
h
s (c  cˇhs ).
It can be verified that, for ⌫h su ciently small in norm, uh 2 U . We have
uh
0
(c, ⌫h) = uˇh
0
(c) +
X
s, 
⇢hs 
0
(c) ⌫hs (c  cˇhs ) +
X
s, 
⇢hs (c) ⌫
h
s ,
25Unlike Citanna et al. (1998), we perturb the gradient of the utility functions instead of their
Hessian. Also, we have state-independent separable utility so additional care has to be exercised in
perturbing utilities in di↵erent states.
26The existence of such a “bump” function is well-known. See Guillemin and Pollack (1974),
chapter 1.
29
so that
D⌫hs u
h0(cˇhs , ⌫
h) = 1. (18)
Let ⌫  := {⌫hs }h2H,s2S, and ⌫ := {⌫ } 2⌃. In order to show that condition C3 holds,
we will perturb agents’ period 1 utility functions via perturbations of ⌫.
Lemma A.5 Suppose S   2JH, J   H   1, and R is in general position. Then,
for a generic subset of E , condition C3 is satisfied at any equilibrium.
Proof :
Let ⇤  be the JH ⇥ S matrix defined by
⇤  :=
0BB@
...
. . .
⇣
uhs 
0
rs   uh0 0 p 
⌘
. . .s
...h
1CCA
.
We first establish that
⇤ :=
✓
⇤ ˇ
⇤ ˆ
◆
has full row rank, for all  ˇ 6=  ˆ. Without loss of generality we can take  ˇ =  1 and
 ˆ =  2. Let ⇤ˆ be the (square) submatrix of ⇤ consisting of the first 2JH columns
of ⇤. Let  7 2 R2JH . We will show that, for a generic subset of UH ⇥⇧, there is no
solution to
 7(y 1 , p 1 , y 2 , p 2 , 7, ⌫ 1 , ⌫ 2 , ⇡
1, ⇡2) :=
0BBBBBB@
F 1(y 1 , p 1 , ⌫ 1 , ⇡
1)
F 2(y 2 , p 2 , ⌫ 2 , ⇡
2)P
s ⇡s 1   ⇡ 1P
s ⇡s 2   ⇡ 2
⇤ˆ(y 1 , p 1 , y 2 , p 2 , ⌫ 1 , ⌫ 2) 7
 >7  7   1
1CCCCCCA = 0.
We restrict ourselves to the generic subset of endowments and information structures
(⌦R \ ⌦C) ⇥ ⇧C for which Lemma A.4 applies, so that we can parametrize agents’
period 1 utility functions by the vector ⌫, and for which the number of equilibria is
finite. Recall that ⌦C is a subset of ⌦Z , for which D⇡1,⇡2Z has full row rank (see
Lemma A.2).
The Jacobian, Dy 1 ,p 1 ,y 2 ,p 2 , 7,⌫ 1 ,⌫ 2 ,⇡1,⇡2 7, is row-equivalent to0BBBBBB@
*
   ⇤    D⇡1,⇡2Z
———————————————————————————
*
   D⌫ 1 ,⌫ 2 (⇤ˆ 7)    0———————————————————————————
Dy 1 ,p 1g 1 0 0
     
0 Dy 2 ,p 2g 2 0
   0    0
0 0  >7
     
1CCCCCCA
.
(19)
30
We wish to show that this matrix has full row rank at any zero of  7. Since D⇡1,⇡2Z,
Dy 1 ,p 1g 1 and Dy 2 ,p 2g 2 have full row rank, and  7 6= 0, it su ces to show that
the middle block of (19) has full row rank. Using (18), we see that this block is
block-diagonal with respect to h 2 H and   2 { 1,  2}, with typical diagonal term
given by [. . . 7srs . . .s2JH ]. This diagonal term has full row rank by the same
argument that we used for the bottom left block of (14). It follows that the Jacobian
Dy 1 ,p 1 ,y 2 ,p 2 , 7,⌫ 1 ,⌫ 2 ,⇡1,⇡2 7 has full row rank, at every zero of  7. Thus  7 is
transverse to zero, and   17u⇡(0) = ? for all (u, ⇡) in a generic subset of UH ⇥ ⇧C .
Now that we have established that ⇤ has full row rank, consider the matrix Q,
defined in (12). We have
Q =
 
diag [⇤ ]
——————–
. . . IS . . . 
!
.
The upper submatrix of Q has full row rank due to the full row rank of ⇤, and clearly
the lower submatrix of Q has full row rank as well. If Q does not have full row rank,
there exist vectors a  2 RJH ,   2 ⌃, and b 2 RS, not all of which are zero, such that
a> ⇤  + b = 0, for all  . Moreover, since ⇤  has full row rank, b 6= 0. It follows that
the row spaces of {⇤ } 2⌃ have a nontrivial intersection. But this contradicts the
full row rank property of ⇤.
The utility perturbations in this proof apply only to the particular equilibrium
under consideration. However, we can repeat the same construction for each equi-
librium, and take the intersection of the generic subsets for which the Jacobian of
 7 has full row rank. This intersection is itself a generic subset since the number of
equilibria is finite (recall that endowments are restricted to ⌦R). 2
Proof of Corollary 1:
Let E⇤ be the generic subset of economies for which Theorem 2 applies. An inspection
of the proofs of Lemmas A.1–A.5 reveals that E⇤ can be written as ⌦⇤ ⇥ ⇥, where
⌦⇤ is a generic subset of ⌦, and ⇥ is a generic subset of UH ⇥ ⇧ (in particular, we
do not perturb endowments jointly with either utilities or probabilities in any of the
transversality arguments in these proofs). Moreover, ⌦⇤ is a subset of ⌦R, the set of
regular economies (this condition was imposed in the proof of Lemma A.5).
Fix a (u, ⇡) in ⇥, and consider an !⇤ in ⌦⇤. Since the economy (!⇤, u, ⇡) is
regular, it has a finite number of equilibria, which we index by i = 1, . . . , n. By
Theorem 2, for the i’th ⇡-equilibrium, there exist ⇡ˆi and ⇡ˆ
0
i in ⇧ˆ(⇡), such that
W ⌧ 0 at a ⇡ˆi-equilibrium and W   0 at a ⇡ˆ0i-equilibrium (the information struc-
tures ⇡ˆi and ⇡ˆ
0
i are in a neighborhood of ⇡, and the corresponding equilibria are
in a neighborhood of the i’th ⇡-equilibrium). Using the regularity of (!⇤, u, ⇡)
once again, there exists ✏i > 0, such that the preceding statement applies for all
! 2 B✏i(!⇤) := {! 2 ⌦⇤ s.t. |!   !⇤| < ✏i}, for the same choice of ⇡ˆi and ⇡ˆ0i.
By Theorem 1, there is a generic subset ⌦ˆi of ⌦ such that every ⇡-equilibrium
is ex-post ⇡ˆi-ine cient, and a generic subset ⌦ˆ0i of ⌦ such that every ⇡-equilibrium
is ex-post ⇡ˆ0i-ine cient. Therefore, statements (i)–(iii) of the corollary apply for all
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! 2 O!⇤ := \ni=1[B✏i(!⇤) \ ⌦ˆi \ ⌦ˆ0i]. Indeed, they apply for all ! 2 ⌦¯ := [!⇤2⌦⇤ O!⇤ .
We claim that ⌦¯ is a generic subset of ⌦. Let ✏ := mini ✏i. Then, clearly, the set
O!⇤ is an open, dense subset of B✏(!⇤). The set ⌦¯, being the union of these open
subsets of ⌦⇤, is itself an open subset of ⌦⇤. Moreover, ⌦¯ is dense in ⌦⇤, since for all
!⇤ 2 ⌦⇤, there is a corresponding set O!⇤ , the closure of which contains !⇤. Thus ⌦¯
is a generic subset of ⌦⇤, and hence also of ⌦. 2
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